Parametric excitation refers to dynamics problems in which the forcing function enters into the governing differential equation as a variable coefficient. Evolutionary dynamics refers to a mathematical model of natural selection (the "replicator" equation) which involves a combination of game theory and differential equations. In this paper we apply perturbation theory to investigate parametric resonance in a replicator equation having periodic coefficients. In particular, we study evolution in the Rock-Paper-Scissors game, which has biological and social applications. Here periodic coefficients could represent seasonal variation. We show that 2:1 subharmonic resonance can destabilize the usual "Rock-Paper-Scissors" equilibrium for parameters located in a resonant tongue in parameter space. However, we also show that the tongue may be absent or very small if the forcing parameters are chosen appropriately.
Introduction
Evolutionary dynamics formalizes the process of evolution by combining game theory with differential equations [1] [2] [3] . Evolution is driven by natural selection: organisms with greater fitness (i.e., number of offspring) tend to become more common, while less fit organisms are driven to extinction. To describe evolution mathematically, game theory is used to represent the fitness of each type of organism in a given population. Then, differential equations describe how the abundances of each type of organism change based on those fitnesses.
Organism types can be thought of as 'strategies' in a game theoretic sense, which interact and earn payoffs (representing reproductive success) based on the strategy of each interacting agent. Here we consider one of the canonical games from evolutionary game theory, "Rock-Paper-Scissors" (RPS). There are three possible strategies: rock (R), paper (P) and scissors (S). As in the children's game of the same name, rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock. If winning earns a payoff of þ1 while losing earns a payoff of À1, RPS can be described by the following payoff matrix:
where the payoff in a given cell is that of the row strategy when playing against the column strategy. Evolution is fundamentally a process of change over time, and so it is desirable to add a dynamic component to the payoff matrix. Strategies with above average payoff should increase in abundance while strategies with below average payoff should decrease. One popular approach, the "replicator equation," does so using differential equations [2, 4] . The replicator equation describes deterministic evolutionary dynamics in a well-mixed, infinitely large population, and is defined as follows. Let A ij be the payoff of strategy i playing against strategy j, and x i be the fraction of players in the population using strategy i. Assuming there are N possible strategies, we have the constraint
The "fitness" (or expected payoff) of an individual playing strategy i is given by
and the replicator equation stipulates that
where U is chosen as
so that the constraint, Eq. (2), is satisfied.
In this paper, we use the replicator equation to study the RPS game because of RPS's wide range of applications in both biology and social science. The cyclical dynamics of RPS provide a natural model for many similarly cyclical natural phenomena. Two of the most widely cited examples involve mating patterns of the sideblotched lizard Uta stansburiana [5] and toxin and antidote production in mutant forms of the bacteria Escherichia coli [6] . In each case, there are three strategies, each of which out-competes another and is out-competed by the third. The result is cyclic dominance, with no strategy as the clear winner. This type of RPS dynamic has also been used to explain the "paradox of the plankton," in which ecosystems support a much greater degree of biodiversity than suggested by the number of ecological niches [7] .
Outside of biology, RPS evolutionary dynamics have also been used to model a range of social interactions. Here, the dynamics describe a process of social learning via imitation rather than genetic evolution. Each person has a strategy, and people preferentially imitate the strategies of more successful others, ignoring the strategies chosen by the less successful. Thus natural selection operates on strategy abundances, producing a replicator dynamic identical to genetic evolution. One example of an RPS dynamic in human social interactions involves optional cooperative relationships [8] [9] [10] : selfish players invade a population of cooperative players, loners who abstain invade a population of selfish players, and cooperators invade a population of loners. Another example comes from opinion formation in political elections [11] , where a set of candidates may each have arguments which expose weakness in another candidate, but are vulnerable to attacks from a third. 1 In the present work, we add periodic variation in payoffs to the RPS game. These periodic effects could represent, for example, fitness changes caused by seasonal fluctuations in the weather, or earning changes caused by seasonal variation in consumer spending. This paper builds on previous work from our group [12, 13] . In Ref. [12] , we studied the linear stability of an RPS system with periodic coefficients. In Ref. [13] , we extended the work by considering the nonlinear stability of a similar system. In the present work we consider the linear stability of a similar system which however contains a larger number of parameters. We find that by thus increasing the number of parameters, we are able to observe events which would be unlikely to occur in a system with few parameters. In particular we have discovered that the model supports the disappearance of tongues of resonant instability.
Model
We are interested in an extension of the RPS model where the payoffs vary periodically with time. More specifically we consider a RPS payoff matrix of the form:
Here, the strength and frequency of the variation can be manipulated by the x and A i parameters. This payoff matrix gives rise to three replicator equations given by Eq. (4) which can then be reduced to two equations on x 1 and x 2 by eliminating x 3 via the constraint, Eq. (2),
The result is
where
Setting A i ¼ 0, gives the original RPS model where the dynamics of the replicator equations (Eqs. (7) and (8)) can be described by the first integral
Equation (12) represents a family of curves, each of which corresponds to a motion which is periodic in time. In Fig. 1 we see the integral curves for various values of the constant in Eq. (12) . We also find that for Eqs. (7) and (8), the points (1,0), (0,1) and (0,0) are equilibria and the lines x 1 ¼ 0, x 2 ¼ 0 and
. There is also an interior equilibrium point at ð1=3; 1=3Þ. The presence of the time-varying periodic terms A i cos xt destroys the first integral, Eq. (12). In addition, for general values of the A i these terms destroy the equilibrium at (1/3),(1/3). We wish to consider the case in which this equilibrium is preserved under the periodic forcing. From Eqs. (7) and (8) , this will require that G 1 and G 2 vanish at x 1 ¼ x 2 ¼ 1=3. This turns out to require the following relationship between the A i coefficients:
To satisfy Eq. (13), we set
This corresponds to the payoff matrix
and to the following governing differential equations:
In our previous work [12, 13] , we showed that for the case of In this work we seek to investigate the existence of such tongues for the more general case, Eqs. (14) and (15) , in which
Subharmonic Resonance
We begin by investigating the linear stability of the interior equilibrium point. First we move the interior equilibrium point to the origin for convenience.
Then substitute Eqs. (19) into Eqs. (17) and (18)
For a linear stability analysis, we linearize Eqs. (20) and (21)
Now, we transform this system of first-order ODEs into a secondorder ODE for convenience in eliminating secular terms in the upcoming perturbation method. We find
We may now use a perturbation method to determine the stability of the interior equilibrium which has now been moved to the origin, under the assumption of small forcing amplitudes. To use the perturbation method we make a change of variables s ¼ xt and denote 0 as a derivative with respect to s. We also write A i ! A i . This gives, neglecting terms of
To begin with, we determine the resonant value of x at OðÞ by setting
Substituting Eq. (32) into Eq. (28) and collecting terms gives
From Eq. (33), we see that x 0 will have a solution with frequency 1= ffiffi ffi 3 p x whereupon the right hand side of Eq. (34) will have terms with frequencies
Resonant values of x will correspond to forcing frequencies Eq. (38) which are equal to natural frequencies of the homogeneous x 1 equation, i.e., to 1= ffiffi ffi 3 p x. This gives that
This value of x corresponds to the largest resonance tongue.
There are an infinitude of smaller tongues which would emerge from the perturbation method if we were to continue it to Oð 2 Þ and higher. These have been shown [12] to be of the form x 0 ¼ 2=ðn ffiffi ffi 3 p Þ for n ¼ 2; 3; ::: but will not concern us in this paper.
In order to investigate the nature of the dynamical behavior in the neighborhood of the resonance, Eq. (39), we define two time scales n and g n ¼ s; g ¼ s
and we consider x to be a function of n and g, whereupon the chain rule gives
We detune x off of the resonance Eq. (39)
and expand x ¼ x 0 þ x 1 þ Á Á Á. Substituting Eqs. (41) and (42) and these expansions into Eq. (28) and collecting terms, we obtain
where the functions h i in Eq. (45) are the same as the functions H i in Eq. (28) with s replaced by n and x replaced by 2= ffiffi ffi 3 p . We take the solution of Eq. (44) in the form
We substitute the expression for x 0 Eq. (46) into the x 1 Eq. (45), and remove secular terms, giving the slow flow
Equations (47) and (48) are a constant coefficient linear system with the following eigenvalues:
For given parameters A 2 ; A 4 ; A 5 ; A 6 , the equilibrium point a ¼ b ¼ 0 will be either unstable (exponential growth) or stable (quasi-periodic motion) depending respectively on whether the eigenvalues, Eq. (49), are real or imaginary. The transition between stable and unstable will correspond to zero eigenvalues, given by the condition
Equation (50) will yield two values of k 1 , let's call them k 1 ¼ 6Q, which from Eq. (43) plot as two straight lines in the x À plane, representing the boundaries of the 2:1 subharmonic resonance tongue, see Fig. 2 . Inside this tongue the equilibrium is unstable due to parametric resonance 
From Floquet theory [14, 15] we know that on the transition curves which define the two sides of the tongue, i.e., which separate regions of stability from regions of instability, there exists a periodic solution having frequency x=2 (a "subharmonic"). To prove that the tongue has truly disappeared (rather than approximately so as in perturbation theory), we must show that there COEXISTS two linearly independent solutions having frequency x=2. 
